Human Profile

Chapter 5 gracious Factors in tune warranter limit Page INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Background on gentle fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 FAA AND HUMAN FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 FAA insurance form _or_ system of government and conceptions for Human Factors and breeze certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 FAA Requirements for Aviation aegis Human-Factors Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Other Issues for Human Factors and compose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Box Box Page 5-A. UAL advanced Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Chapter 5 Human Factors in Aviation pledge factors in these cases cigargontte greatly modify the utilization of engine room for air lane aegis. Dramatic accidents ca morald by tender errors in the nuclear power, chemical, and conveyance industries consume increased semipublic attention to world surgical process issues during the past decade. excess study requirements, revise operative procedures, warning devices, and expanded organization circumspection ar typical recommendations following accident investigations.However, these stopgap measures address solely the surface of problems that argon rooted in the Gordian interactions of pack and equipment indoors the roundr dust and the institutional and organizational structures and procedures that baffle the planning, design, and trouble of these sy shucks. undermentioned the ground col lision of twain jetliners in Detroit in celestial latitude 1990, Dr. conjuration Lauber, a member of the National Transportation Board, said that fundamental bothy the air power arranging of rules, the counseling were operating it, al or so considers nearly error-free charitable surgery. Similar c erstwhilerns tidy sum be echoed for the aura hostage systema routine of succeederful airway terrorist events tolerate been traced to a merciful ill fortune. 2 The ch altogetherenge is to design a system. . which is tolerant of those errors when they do occur and which detects and traps them before we give birth a catastrophe. 3 Multilayered defenses ar employed at many an(prenominal) commercial airports and air lane terminals, and certification managers and g overnment authorities argon turning to new technologies to exactlytress these systems. Heretofore, federal requirements and constancy use of certification technologies have usually been with specific proc eeds in mind.As large as the technical goals could be met effectively, the equipment was considered satisfactory and mankind doing problems link to the technology were resolved through revised reading and procedures. engine room use in counterterrorism will likely increase dramatically over the near decade, alone if early and INTRODUCTION Human resources be critical to airmanship certificate. shelter strength passenger and baggage screeners, guards and law enforcement portionrs, and airport and air passage employees in everyday- argon important elements of a system that prevents and deters hostile acts against air carriers. engineering science mess enhance, just now can non replace, the capabilities of these people and the many services they provide. Moreover, vigilance practices establish on behavioural research findings can further improve human surgical procedure. This chapter considers the function of screeners in weapons and explosives detection, and the fi bre of guards, officers, and well-nigh other line employees in discovering (and deterring) suspicious individuals or situations. Within the past 20 years, technology has greatly increased the power and productivity of these protective covering people.Metal detectors and roentgen ray devices atomic number 18 spendthrifter, to a greater extent accu order, and to a greater extent socially acceptable tools for m withdrawing passengers and baggage than manual searches. Remote television and other supervise devices, computer- fitled access to restricted areas, and talk and in ground levelation systems allow house-to-house surveillance and nemesis sagaciousness. While these technologies raise the capabilities of a protective cover system to new trains, their ultimate success and sincere comp permiteance depend on the people who design, operate, and maintain them.Many pledge assignments require repetitive tasks and close monitoring for rare events functions that humans perform disadvantageously. Selecting well(p)-suited individuals, training them properly, designing their work purlieu and rotation schedule to elicit the best possible performance, and providing motivating incentives are funda moral requirements for lucky operations, regardless of the type of technology in place. These functions take up human performance application of human p. A17. IJohn Lauber quoted by John H. Cushmau younger , Test for Aviation Coping with Human Shortcomings,The New York Times, Dec. 0, 1990, ne sample was the destruction of a Korean Air Lines flight over the Andaman ocean by a bomb planted by North Korean agents. The device, in a carry-on bag, was ahnost detected at a protective covering checkpoint in Baghdad at an in the first place stop. When a security department guard wished to send off the batteries from a radio, one terrorist turned the radio on, proving it operated, and then raised a hue and cry, yelling and complaining. Instead of using this a s a earth to stop the two suspect individuals and to examine their attribute minutely, the security forces discrete to avoid trouble by allowing them to proceed. Laur, op. cit. , footnote 1. 79 80 q Technology Against Terrorism Structuring Security methodic attention is not given to human performance issues, we whitethorn expect that system efficiency and effectiveness will be materially impaired. Background on Human Error The human role in a security system is complex thus the constitution of human errors, from mental to physical, varies widely. Mental or cognitive errors can include improper judgment or decisivenessmaking, while physical errors may stem from motor skill deficiencies or faulty equipment design.A combination of physical and mental processes may catch other kinds of errors, much(prenominal)(prenominal) as those involving communication, perception, or alertness. Human factors, a discipline combining behavioral sciences and design, focuses on improving the per formance of complex systems of people and machines. Designing and operating a system so that it does not induce human error (in fact, designing it so that human error may be minimized) is one critical component of human factors and limiting the impact of a human error once it occurs is some other aspect.Many types of human error are systematic, following certain predictable patterns once these patterns are identified, countermeasures can be substantial. For example, poor location of switches or dials can induce manual or perceptual errors. For those types of human error that do not follow predictable patterns, mitigation techniques are difficult to develop. both(prenominal) examples of mitigation techniques include automatic monitoring and warning devices. These subsystems, when properly k immediatelying and implemented, can be invaluable tools for negating human error.Employee enduranceallowing into the system altogether those people least likely to bugger off mistakes and c ontinued quality control maintained through training and monitoring are canonic go for minimizing human errors. Potential errors can be forestalled by the use of well-worn procedures and checklists for routine and emergency tasks, planning work shifts and assignments so as not to induce inattention and 4EM1 L. hlC. , fatigue, and properly designing the work environment. If human factors engineering is done properly at the conceptual and design stage, the cost is high, but paid merely once.If tranin g must redeem for poor design, the expenditure is paid every day. 4 According to one expert, there does not appear to be a strong need for new basic research in human factors associate spectifically to security-behavioral science findings in general and pay off with human performance problems in other industries are likely sufficient to enhance current security operations. 5 For example, such companionship is world employ to upgrade security screener selection by air ducts, and to improve training standards.However, the mechanisms to bring up early on and to address effectively the human performance issues stemming from new security technologies, such as explosives detection systems, are not yet in place in intentness or the federal Government. Shifting boring and repetitive tasks that people perform poorly to machines is an progression that can reduce errors. However, automate devices (or any new technology) may create new sources of human error. 6 Excessive false alarms unnecessarily distract operators and may lead to the device being ignored or disabled.During unusual or emergency circumstances, the lack of flexibility in many automated systems can be a serious limitation and the human backup may not be mentally or physically prepared (or possibly even capable) to take over. Consequently, a full system approach is required for reducing total human errors. FAA AND HUMAN FACTORS FAA Policy and Plans for Human Factors and Aviation Security In a re port released in July 1988, OTA concluded that FAA attention to the spectrum of human performance problems in commercial gentle wind fell far short of the level warranted, since human error is the direct cause of tune accidents. Later that same year, Congress passed the Aviation precaution Nagel wiener, $cwit Automation Hun acor in Aviation, Eu1 L. wiener and David c. (eds. ) (Sm Diego, CA Academic PESS, 1988) p. 454. SH. cfion FoUShee, cef scienlc and Tec Advi,qor for Human FaCto, FAA pso wmmunimtio 1991. 6see wiener, op. cit. , fote 4, Ch. 13 for a discourseion of new and subtle types of human error that have resulted from the introduction of automation into aircraft cockpits. W. S. Congress, OffIce of Technology discernment Safe Skies for Tomorrow Aviation Safefy in a Competitive Environnzent, OE4-SET-381 (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Offke, July 1988). Chapter 5-Hurnun Factors in Aviation Security q 81 Research Act, which directed the FAA to expand its research trials on human performance in air power and authorized funds specifically for that purpose. 8 The FAA responded by creating the position of Chief Scientific and technical foul Advisor for Human Factors, amenable for coordinating for the FAA various human-factors research efforts within the FAA NASA, and the DOD and for opening lines of communication within the FAA and industry.Communication among Federal agencies is critical, since decisions make by the aviation industry and the operational and regulatory sections of the FAA lots drive the need for new human-factors research and could receipts from an apprehensiveness of humanfactors research findings and products. The FAA has made progress in addressing the earlier reprehension of its human-factors programs and understanding in aircraft and air work control (ATC) equipment and operations.However, the key shortcomings in FAA human-factors efforts that OTA cited in its 1988 study-insufficient agency expertness, uncoordinat ed research efforts, and regulations and certification standards that do not reflect human-factors principles-still exist within FAA civil aviation security programs. During the frame of its study, OTA examined closely many of the technology developing programs and regulatory efforts underway in the security sections of FAA and found a general lack of awareness and understanding of the human-factors issues involved with possible new security technologies.An exception to this situation, however, and a shining indicator of a new trend, has been the hiring of a human-factors expert at the FAA Technical Center to oversee human-factors research as it relates to flight path business security. However, at present, it appears that the FAA is ill-prepared to identify and address possible human-factors concerns with the increasely complex and diverse security technologies now under development. The dearth of trained humanfactors specialists in areas of the FAA responsible for civil aviat ion security is a serious deficiency.Until recently, the Aviation Security R&D Service of the Technical Center would have merited similar concerns, but this shortcoming is being redressed, at least in part. roughly of the expertise that the FAA is developing on human factors for other uses could to a fault be apply to security issues. cardinal electromotive force vehicle for bringing human-factors knowledge into aviation security efforts is the National Plan for Aviation Human Factors (HF Plan), the first study product of the heightened FAA attention to human performance issues following the enactment of the Aviation Safety Research Act.The HF Plan identifies significant human performance issues and lays out a 10-year blueprint for establishing and coordinating research programs and conveying the results crossways Federal agencies and industry. The HF Plans development depended strongly on advisory committees composed of a cross-section of research, operational, and regulato ry representatives from government and industry and approximately 50 of the nations leading human-factors researchers. The dear(p) cognition information for aviation security is that the Plan appears to provide a strong ft for multi- and cross-disciplinary efforts and understanding in human factors and has begun to institutionalize and focus rumination of human-factors issues in FAA decisionmaking. The bad news is that nowhere in the Plan is security mentionedthe Plan addresses the following five aviation environments only aircraft flight deck, air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, airway facilities maintenance, and flight deck/ATC integration.This should not be construed as animadversion of the general thrust of the HF Planthe human-factors categories considered have historically been more than critical to aviation galosh and are considerably more complex than human performance issues in security-and it is beyond the scope of this study to crumble in detail the specif ics of the HF Plan. However, some documentarys and products of the HF Plan peradventure directly transferable to aviation security, provided that lines of communication are established and security experts are included in committee structures.The Plan has eight objectives, all of which can apply to aviation security, but the following two are especially pertinent, given the present attention to technologies for countering terrorism . to encourage the development of principles of human-centered automation and the design of SAviation Stieu Research emailprotected I%blic bW 100-591. %J. S. surgical incision of Transportation Fedeml Aviation Administratio The National Plan For Aviation Human Factors, vol. I, draf November 1990. 82 q Technology Against Terrorism Structuring Security dvanced technology that will capitalize on the relative strengths of humans and machines . to develop human factors-oriented validation and certification standards for aviation system hardware and personn el office department that will enhance both safety and efficiency . 10 The HF Plan is intentional to be reexamined and revised periodically and aviation security could be added explicitly as a focus area if need and resources warrant. Crucial to the development and future success of the HF pian is the Human Factors arrange Committee (HFCC), formed by the FAA administra11 tor in September 1989.HFCC has representatives from for each one major division of FAA and serves as an advisory physical structure for senior management of FAA in all matters involving human performance and is intend to assure that human factors issues are represented in all FAA activities. 12 Until very recently, the sponsor executive director for Civil Aviation Security was not represented on this committee. However, this omission has since been recti13 critical-flight safety is at risk only when security performance fails at the same time that a nemesis occurs.Moreover, FAA staff and the agency cul- ture are predominantly interested in aviation technology and operations and protecting facilities and countering terrorism are not an native part of aviation, l4 However, the increasing Complexity of screening technologies and the continuing (possibly increasing) terrorist panic make the performance of aviation security systems more critical to flight safety. fied. Aviation terrorist events in the 1980s made apparent the shortcomings of the minimum Federal security requirements.The FAA and the airlines both foc apply attention on screener selection and training, detection and screening technologies, and airline management of security programs and systems. The FAA has increased requirements and circumspection of security personnel (selection, training, and management) and equipment (weapons and explosives detectors), but has not yet addressed how security personnel and equipment perform as components of a system. Screener Selection and Training For years, the people who screened airli ne passengers and baggage for domestic flights primarily received light training, low locks, and few wellbeings.Consequently, alarmin g numbers of domestic 15 FAA Requirements for Aviation Security Human-Factors Implications Aviation security personnel and equipment have received (and have not compulsory) the same level of regulatory and certification attention that the FAA places on flightcrew, air-traffic controllers, and ground brook personnel and their respective aviation equipment. The FAA has foc utilise its regulatory efforts on elements of the aviation system essential to flight safety. For example, the performance of pilots and aircraft systems are continuously critical for maintaining safety-a failure could cause an accident.On the other hand, the performance of the security system (other than as a deterrent) is rarely not screeners failed unannounced FAA streaks (22 share failure rate in 1988). 16 Since there has not been a revolting domestic terrorist scourge a gainst aviation in the united States, these shortcomings have not resulted in deportment or property losses. 17 In light of public ram following the Lockerbie disaster and costly fines stermming from FAA inspections, the Air Transport Association (ATA) substantial an extensive set of screener selection, training, and compensation standards.ATA pro- 1%id. , p. 3. lllbid. , p. 28. l%id. , p. 28. lsundm tie FAA rgatio sce fi plaW in 1988 emailprotected 1990, tie Office of Aviation Security wu represented the Executive Director for Regulatory Standards and Compliance, to whom it reported. 14fiowlge of aviation twolow d Operatiom i5 impot to fict ad ofi sty. For eple, spec characteristics of aviatio such as large volumes of people and luggage that must be screened quickly, drive the security system design and functions.IsHowever, es ustomy ve gher snds for security personuel working h ktWtEitiOlld OpelZitiOllS. 16Lpe Osmus, office of Aviation Security, FW, personalised COllMIluIlk titiOIL Feb. 22, 1991. emailprotected on tie deffitio he desction of a PSA ftight in 1987, caused by a disgruntled ex-emPIOYW Who Shot tie flying conclave in emailprotected t aircraft be considered a terroris4 as well as criminal, act. In this case, theex-employee had an identifkation card with which he gained access to the so screener training was not an issue. Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security 83 posed that airlines (or their security haveors) 18 consider education and health criteria, the ability to speak English, and aptitude test results before hiring screeners, and that they offer competitive wages, benefits, and incentives and follow a comp training curriculum. In March 1990, the ATA asked the FAA to adopt its proposal as requirements for all airlines. ground on this cooperative industry effort, the FAA has required some of these suggested upgrades in training measures for screeners. (Most U. S. irlines have adopted at least some of the ATA recommendations the failure rate on random checks has since dropped significantly. )19 The FAA decided not to include selection and wage standards because such a change would require public comment (i. e. , through the Federal Register), thereby calling attention to perceived or actual security weaknesses. rewards to those who detect test weapons and explosives (and even higher rewards to those who find the certain thing) and increasing wages to at least the topical anaesthetic prevailing rate. For comparison, in Israel, screeners are paid at a level considered a good salary, far higher than minimum wage. In Switzerland, they are paid at the rate of about $lOper hour. In the unite States, rates are ofttimes near minimum wage. prudence Practices and Human Performance The FAA mandates certain positions in an airlines organizational structure, such as a security director for the airline and security coordinators at each airport, but airline management practices and philosophy usually fall outside the scope of FAA 20 regulatory authority.In Safe Skies for Tomorrow, OTA found that the effect of airline operating or management practices on airline safety, and changes in those practices, were rarely addressed in FAA safety analyses. 21 The FAAs Human Factors plan cites the influence of management shade on human performance as one area where basic research is needed. 22 If the organizational climate (i. e. , working conditions, wages, management, organizational culture, etcetera ) does not allow an individual to perform at his or her peak, it may not matter how well he or she is trained or how well designed the technology is. 3 The ATA proposal for upgrading screener standards suggests giving screeners employee benefits general in many industries (vacation, holiday, medical) that contractors often dont receive) offering to contractors the advantages of airline employment (e. g. , low-cost transit) and career opportunities to top performers providing monetary The linked Airlines approach to improving screener performance on all flights from selected airports delineates one set of management techniques (box 5-A). Another approach has been under taken by American Airlines, lthough only for its international flights. 24 American treats its international screeners as part of the American team. They are chartered as full-fledged airline employees, not employees of a contracted security agency, and enjoy the same salary levels and benefits that ticketing agents do. The educational level of entrants appears relatively high, with a few individuals having advanced degrees. There appears also to be a real opportunity for advancement within American Airlines, and not just in the security division.Before starting work, the entrants are brought to Dallas (from across the world many screeners are hired from the countries in which they will be working) for 2 weeks of training at Americans headquarters. The training includes emphasis on the screening questions as well as on what to look for on the x-ray screens. The screeners ask the standard questions as to who packed the baggage and whether anyone could have placed pitch-black in it. But they also ask general questions regarding destination and travel plans, somewhat akin to the lines of questioning performed by El Al.Indeed, American has used Israeli security consultants in designing their security system. The screeners look for a number of specific characteristics, which remain proprietary to the company. If too many of the characteristics chequer a passenger, the individuals baggage will receive very untold closer inspection. Screeners are ro- 18Most screeg for domestic flights in the United States is conducted by security Contractors, nOtairhe employC%S. lwe Osmus, op. cit. , footnote 16. u. s. Conwss, OffIce of Technology Assessment, op. it. ,fOOtiOte 7. 211bid. , p. 88. 22U. S. segment of Transportatio Federal Aviation Administration op. Cit. , fOOtnOte 9, p. 15. Ibid. 24s0 Site yack t . D* emailprotected% December 1$)90, and Homer emailprotected Chief of Sedty, American Airlines, perSOIlal COmmCatiO December 1990. 84 q Technology Against Terrorism Structuring Security tated amidst looking at x-ray screens and interviewing passengers. Periodically, security systems are tested by contractors, who choose an American employee to play a terrorist.A specific scenario is given to this impostor, and the reaction of the security personnel is noted. If they do not perform their functions, they may be subject to severe discipline, including termination. The result of the overall approach, using incentives and panic of discipline for negligence, appears to be a well-motivated and alert force. Box 5-AUAL Hi-Tech Screening United Airlines is focusing on management practices in its program, called Hi-Tech Screening, to improve the quality of pre-departure screening and the public perception of this highly visible function.Begun in 1987 at Chicago OHare and San Francisco Airpo rts, the program incorporated many of the selection and incentive move later recommended in the ATA proposal, and also attempted to integrate technology and people by reconfiguring the screening environment to make it more pleasant for screeners and passengers as well as to improve operations. Although wages are still low, successful workers have the opportunity to join the UAL organization, instead of working as contract security personnel.Improvements include direct communication links to supervisors for oversight and advice to screeners, layout designed to minimize passenger delays, and multiple cues to passengers that security measures are being taken in a professional reamer (security supervisor in an towering booth, passengers see themselves on video monitors as they go through metal detectors, signs describing procedures are clear and concise). United believes that the program has been successful to date in increasing public awareness and employee morale and competence.At Chicago, the employee attrition rate dropped by half and weapon detections and FAA test scores increased significantly (79 pct detection rate on FAA weapons tests prior to Hi-Tech and 92 pct subsequently). United has also installed Hi-Tech Screening systems in Denver, LOS Angeles, Seattle, and Washington Dunes, with plans for additive implementation in the future. SOURCE Site visit to OHare, April 1990, and Richard Davis, practicable Security, United Airlines, Jan. 3,1991.Security Equipment Currently, the FAA requires airlines to employ relatively few types of security equipment primarily x-ray devices and metal detectors. The FAA established minimum performance standards for detecting weapons and explosives, and since these technologies are radiation-establish, the FAA also requires that they carry through Federal health and safety standards . 25 There are no standards governing operator interaction with the equipment, such as the layout of controls and introduction symbology resources. At the time the FAA established x-ray and metal detector requirements (early 1970s), it had little expertise in human factors.Moreover, these technologies were relatively simple compared with aircraft cockpit and ATC consoles that the FAA had to certify without objective human-factors criteria, making humanfactors standards for security a relatively low priority. However, many behavioral experts argue that properly developed human-factors standards could improve system performance for aviation security as well as safety. In recent years, the FAA has issued regulations for security technologies-computer-controlled access at airports and explosive detection systemsthat are considerably more complex and have wider system implications than x rays and metal detectors.As has is evidenced in the explosive detection system (EDS) regulations published in September 1989 26 and the subsequent performance of TNA, the only device to date that could happen upon the FAA standards. beyo nd setting detection criteria, which are critical to the security system performance, the FAA also included requirements for throughput of the device (which is primarily an economics issuesee ch. 4) and a requirement for 100-percent automated detection decisionmaking. Several lines of reasoning could lead to a design goal of total automation, including lower operating costs over the long run een commonly the case whenever new technology is used to solve a problem, attention is focused on the positive aspects of the technologyhow effective it iswithout giving full consideration to possible new human-factors problems caused by the technology. The lack of attention to man/ machine human-factors and system operating issues Fr xmple, . ray ytms P-Y for cW. on baggage must meet tie snds set by the intellectual nourishment and Drug Administration. x54 Federal Register 36938 (Sept. 5, 1989). Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security q 85 nd possibly removing human error from the operat ing loop. However, it maybe useful, and sometimes vital, to keep the human in the operating/decisionmaking loop, especially if he or she must respond during emergency or unusual conditions. As has been shown so far in TNA tests, the false alarm rate is well preceding(prenominal) earlier goals and human intervention is required quite often. While automation, in the context of an EDS, is a useful tool, and total automation may be an understandable goal, requiring 100 percent automated functions in an EDS is not justified at this time.The E D S regulations provide an example of where input from a group such as the FAAs Human Factors Coordinating Committee could process flag potentially troublesome human-factors aspects of security regulations. Airline passenger indite, in most cases, must be fast (and consequently cursory) enough so as not to impose extravagant delays. In other security contexts, such as screening for the insider threat pen within an organization where time is not so critical, much more elaborated undercoat information and questioning is possible.A different, although overlapping, form of pen is used by law enforcement and investigatory agencies. given up pertinent data and evidence from a crime scene or threat, experts compile a profile of likely social, psychological, and physical characteristics of the criminal. However, much of the work and methodology could be transferred from one of the broad pen regimes to the other. FAA Requirements for profile-Under Federal regulations, U. S. airlines must apply a relatively simple form of passenger indite for international flights (e. g. questions regarding electronic devices), although airlines are not prohibited by FAA/DOT from conducting any form of indite at any time. Whether or not a passenger is selected for closer scrutiny, such as a manual baggage search, depends on where his passport was issued (a factor that varies based on threat intelligence) and on responses to a series of qu estions aimed at identifying potential terrorist dupes. Additionally, airlines must conduct random baggage inspections on a small percentage of otherwise unselected passengers for each flight.These requirements do not apply to domestic flights or to foreign airlines, which results in an obvious gap in protection for Americans. The fact Passenger profile In-depth questioning of all airline passengers and diminutive examin ation of each of their personal belongings and baggage is impossible in a modern deportation system. Since most of the one thousand millions of passengers that fly on U. S. airlines each year pose no security risk, targeting security resources on the small number of passengers who exhibit some elements of the threat profile is one way to increase security without clogging transportation flows. rofiling can be a valuable component of a transportation security system, providing an independent complement to hardware-based (and often more expensive) explosives and w eapons detection technologies. productive pen depends on a large support system including comprehensive intelligence networks and threat analyses, information system technology to process large databases, behavioral research and analysis, and trained and motivated screening personnel.There are two general approaches to operational indite. One compares passenger demographic and other background data (age, sex, nationality, travel itinerary, etc. ) to historic or recent intelligencederived threat profiles. The other is based on the examiners psychological assessment of the passenger, taking into account nervousness, hostility, or other suspicious characteristics. Most profiling systems currently use elements of both approaches to varying degrees. that foreign airlines that compete with U.S. airlines on international routes do not have to satisfy these requirements imposes an economic penalisation on domestic carriers and weakens their ability to compete successfully with foreign carriers, which, in addition, are usually conjuresubsidized. Domestic airlines complain, with justification, that a level playing playing issue should be established to avoid this unfair disadvantage. An option would be to compensate U. S. airlines for the additional costs, either from Federal subsidies or from the Airport Trust Fund. 7 Alternatively, foreign carriers could be required to apply similar security measures on flights landing in the United States to those demanded of U. S. carriers. The United States has forced better security practices in foreign 2% l$)7(j, Congress estiblishedaprecedent for compensating U. S. air carriers forsecuritymeasures incurred in international operatiombyautioritig nearly $10 million for fiscal years 1976-78 (Public practice of law 94-353, sec. 24). In 1982, Congress extended the authorized limit to $15 million (Public Law 97-248, sec. 24(d). Nearly this much was actually disbursed to four U. S. carriers. 84 q Technology Against Terrorism S tructuring Security revocation of landing rights of carriers from those countries in the absence of improvements. airports by threatening coordinating security management decisions and for providing a conduit for a detailed database. 30 The FAA is considering making CPSP mandatory, but a number of carriers oppose it, citing security officer vigilance problems caused by distraction by computer keyboard and display.Knowledgeable FAA and airline personnel claim that airline opposition stems mainly from the increased oversight capabilities that such a system would give the FAA CPSP would provide a detailed record of all airline profiling actions (and errors or failures) that could be used for civil penalty proceedings. Presently, the FAA oversees airline profiling procedures through random or scheduled field visits. The FAA counters that if a would-be malefactor sneaks through, CPSP also can provide documented proof that the airline followed FAA-required procedures, shifting some finan cial obligation for a profiling failure to the FAA. 1 Additionally, there is substantial U. S. airlines operating on European routes have been permitted to substitute their own profiling programs for FAA requirements. 28 Most U. S. airlines and many foreign carriers conduct more extensive profile screening than minimum FAA requirements at foreign airports and some U. S. international gateways. Some airlines train their international employees in profiling techniques while others hire contractors to administer security for their international flights.Proprietary profiling procedures used by these airlines are imitate generally on the Israeli El Al method of profiling which is more comprehensive (and intrusive) than FAA requirements and reportedly includes psychological, social, and political factors. Complaints by certain groups, such as Arab-Americans, claiming harassment, stem from carrier-initiated profiling, not Federal requirements. 29 During the past 5 years, the FAA has deve loped and tested a computer-based profiling tool aimed at potential terrorist hijackers and saboteurs.The Comprehensive Passenger Screening Profile (CPSP) is both a checklist and decision aid for field officers and a data collection system to support profiling enhancements. It encompasses the current FAA required profiling procedures plus additional factors based on a data profile of terrorists, using historical and intelligence sources. The decision process for selecting a passenger for further examination is automated through a series of mathematically weighted yes/no questions (some of which do not require passenger interviews), that the security officer responds to via a keyboard.CPSP is designed for easy modication if intelligence or data analysis indicates a need. In early 1990, the FAA offered CPSP as an option for airlines to meet profiling requirements. Continental Airlines and United Airlines have tested versions of CPSP at a few locations, and have been generally pleased with its performance, especially as a tool for centrally ho emailprotected FAA htelligence, personal communication Oct. 1*, 1990%llid. analytic value to the large data set that would come from CPSP.As discovered during TNA testing, little is know about the baseline average passenger and baggage therefore, general background data, regardless of how well CPSP works operationally, would be valuable for security planning. No names of passengers are (or legally can be) included in such a data set maintained by the Federal Government. 32 However, as hugger-mugger entities, airlines can and do maintain such lists. Other Issues for Human Factors and Profiling Research and instruction Due to security and proprietary concerns, profiling systems in place today are shrouded in secrecy.The technical aspects of their development and numeric measures of their performance are difficult to obtain, although the widespread use at airports across the world attest to airline confidence in profiling Given industry acceptance of profiling technology, the unregulated environment in which profiling systems were developed, and the potential enhanced capabilities and future needs, there is a JOBelq Director, Comorate s, COntinenM fies, rson commtication, od. 15, 1990 and Glen W- Director, XtitiOI. Ud Security, United Airlines, personal communication, Oct. 6, 1990. 31c)P. cit. , footnote 27. qzfiid. Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security q 87 role for a concerted Federal (DOT) effort in profiling R. The primary research fields of interest are in the behavioral sciences and in large database collection and analysis. A useful but neglected approach would be to investigate the role of pagan differences in establishing profiles. Since patterns of behavior considered anomalous in one culture are average in others, understanding cultural effects better could lead to more effective and, possibly, less discriminatory use of profiles. 3 Relevant behavioral research with applications f or profiling is being conducted by a number of Federal agencies, although they generally do not coordinate these research efforts. There is a need to coordinate research and experience in developing terrorist profiles among come to agencies. Also, some work is going on to establish databases of past possibilitys and known terrorists in order to help develop profiles. The FAA conducts a modest profiling research effort that produced the CPSP and is analyzing profiling field tests.However, this effort is housed in the in aviation security. It has worked with in-house experts, with other agencies, and with behavioral scientists under contract. There should be travel taken to guarantee that this institutional knowledge is not lost, due to needed secrecy or personnel turnover. There should also be an effort to bring together knowledge on profiling from the Intelligence Community, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and from the FA A, so that all agencies may productively pool their knowledge.One way of helping assure such interagency communication would be the institution of annual interagency conferences on the topic (see ch. 3). Profiling techniques and related technologies are being added to current security R plans at the FAA Technical Center. The operational aspects of using automated profiling systems, such as data ledger entry and human/computer interaction, are similar to those of many other technologies, and could benefit from further research and development. intelligence section under the Assistant decision maker for Civil Aviation Security with no direct link to FAAs R division.Historically, the FAA pioneered the use of profiles in aviation in the late sixties and early 1970s during the upsurge of hijackings to Cuba. A team of experts under the leadership of the FAA Office of Aviation Medicine was involved in the development of the initial profiles. Limited use of profiles was made during the early 1970s and again in 1980, when immigrants from the Mariel Boatlift began hijacking aircraft to Cuba. Profiles were employed on a limited basis to help stem the wave of hijackings to Cuba by some Marielitos. In the 1970s, the FAA also developed a profile for domestic use to identify persons who might be carrying explosives or incendiary devices in checked baggage. This checked bag profile included several objective elements and was intended for use by airline personnel at ticket counters. This profile was never applied rigorously, although some of its elements were automated by at least one U. S. air carrier. Thus, the FAA has had substantial experience with developing and implementing profiles for useA near-term research need is how best to combine profiling systems with the new security technologies now in the pipeline. In fact, arguments have been made that the TNA device can only function effectively when combined with profilebased selection of baggage to inspect, since fal se alarm rates are high. This is, in fact, being done at the Gatwick tests. Presently, the profiling process results in binary decisionslet the passenger pass into the normal security process (more than 95 percent of passengers) or conduct a manual search of the passenger and his baggage. One possibility would e to expand and refine the decision outcome from profiling to provide multiple screening paths for passengers depending on the level of threat and the accessibility of advanced detection equipment (see ch. 4). A longer term research option is to investigate new technologies to enhance profiling. Rapid access in the field to Federal, international, and, possibly, private databases (i. e. , hotel, credit card) could greatly enhance capabilities. Remote sensing of internal respiration and heart rates and other biological parameters, combined with large universe of discourse databases, automated facial-recognition systems, andSsCustom offici& in the Northern Islands, a U. S. - flag territory, incorporate cultural characteristics in looking for anomalies for profding. a 88 q Technology Against Terrorism Structuring Security biometric passports, all offer new possibilities for on-the-spot psychological and physiological assessments. From past experience, cultural factors particular to the country where the event is taking place frequently influence decisionmaking by local authorities. Some observers report that U. S. fficials who were involved would, on occasion, have benefited by a more detailed knowledge of the dynamics of local social systems. For example, in some cases, although crisis management officials were supposed to be in charge of handling an incident, local cultural or political factors have resulted in the crisis being directed instead by senior office holders, who are untrained for the purpose and unable to provide the rapid decisionmaking that is often required. Some research into systematizing knowledge of relevant aspects of different soci al systems would be useful.In this area, as in profiling, the construction of appropriate databases would be of use to U. S. officials who may be called on to participate in resolving a crisis. At present, there appears to be little coordination among agencies in understanding behavioral aspects of incident management. This lack provides another argument for strengthening interagency coordination in counterterrorism (see ch. 3). Civil Liberties Security systems in general, and profiling methods in particular, trade certain freedoms (e. g. privacy) for safety. profiling methods, based on specific individual characteristics, may be derived from historical experience (e. g. , the large number of Cuban refugees who hijacked aircraft to Cuba in the early 1970s or the examples of hijacking engaged in by members of various Middle east terrorist groups). These characteristics sometimes include physical and cultural features, since these traits are the easiest indicators to verify. Often su ch subjects belong to readily distinguishable minority groups.Therefore, people who possess the characteristics in question but who have no ill intentions (obviously, the great majority) could be subjected to scrutiny that could be considered to encroach on individual freedoms. This study describes measures to meet compelling public safety interests. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to discuss the many legal and societal civil liberties issues involved (e. g. , how much officiousness on privacy is countenanced by a compelling interest of the state? ).It is certain that the technical ability to investigate and record personal histories and characteristics and the demand for the use of such ability will greatly expand, thereby increasing the potential for crossing the fine line protecting constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties. Legislative attention will have to address the tradeoff between public safety and welfare and civil liberties. Policy Options The foll owing policy options address human factors and aviation security. 1. Enhance FAA attention to human factors in security 34 qExplicitly address aviation security in agencywide human-factors planning. The FAA has taken measures to move in this direction. Bolster human-factors expertise under the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and the Aviation Security Research and Development Service at the FAA Technical Center by adding professionals to their respective staffs, especially in light of plans to increase staff levels of both sections significantly during the succeeding(a) few years. One such professional has already been added. Incident Management Human factors also play a role in managing incidents abroad.When U. S. citizens are held hostage in a foreign country, the United States often plays a role in resolving the incident. Some foreign security officials are trained in the United States under assistance programs. But the United States also may participate activ ely, as it did in responding to a number of airline hijackings in the 1980s. q e follo r=omenhtiom included in earlier drafts of this repofi has already been implemented by tie FAA q Add a designee of the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security to the FAAs Human Factors Coordinating Committee.Chapter 5-Human Factors in Aviation Security q 89 2. Consider conducting R on combining passenger profiling techniques with other security technologies. 3. Give consideration to methods for leveling the playing field when imposing requirements on U. S. carriers but not on competing foreign ones. 4. Give consideration to civil liberties issues 5. stemming from Federal aviation security requirements. Coordinate behavioral research into profiling and incident management being conducted in the Federal Government. Arrange periodic interagency conferences on related topics.