Re-Identifying God in Experience Essay -- Argumentative Persuasive Rel

Re-Identifying god in ExperienceABSTRACT If an maintain start of God can constitute evidence for Gods existence, then it moldiness be possible for God to be a perceptual particular, that is, a substantive, enduring intent of perception. Furthermore, if several such experiences ar to be cumulative evidence for Gods existence, then it essential be possible to reidentify God from experience to experience. I testify both(prenominal) a conceptual and an epistemological argument against these possibilities that is derived from the work of Richard Gale. I signal that neither of these arguments is successful. For God to be a perceptual particular, he must have an inner life for God to be reidentified across experiences, he need not exist in dimensions analogous to the spatiotemporal. If an alleged experience of God is to provide evidence for Gods existence, it must be possible for God to be a perceptual particular a substantive, enduring object of perception. If several such experi ences are to be cumulative evidence for Gods existence, it must be possible to re-identify God from experience to experience. I want to examine arguments against each of these possibilities. These arguments are, respectively, a conceptual and an epistemological argument embedded in the writings of Richard Gale.(1)On Gales conceptual argument, for us to have a tenacious concept of an object, O, as a perceptual particular (1) We must receive what it means for O to exist when not perceived. (2) O must be able to be the common object of different experiences, and (3) We must be able to understand the distinction between numerical and qualitative identicalness with regard to O.We need these requirements to distinguish perceptual from phenomenal p... ...1) Richard Gale, On the nature and Existence of God (Cambridge University Press), pp. 326-343, and Richard Gale, Why Alstons Mystical Doxastic Practice is Subjective, Philosophy and Phenomenological interrogation 54 (1994), 869-875.( 2) Why Alstons, p. 872. (3) P. F. Strawson, Individuals, An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London Methuen, 1964), p. 37.(4) Individuals, p. 81.(5) Individuals, p. 77.(6) Gareth Evans, Things Without the Mind - A gossip upon Chapter Two of Strawsons Individuals, in Zak Van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects, Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 76-116. (7) See Jonathan Bennett, Kants Analytic (Cambridge 1966), p. 37(8) See Evans, Things Without the Mind, pp. 81-82.(9) See Merold Westphal, God, Guilt, and Death (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1984).